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Wenz: Court of Appeals of New York: People v. Williams

COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
People v. Williams'
(decided February 23, 2010)
In a consolidated appeal, five defendants challenged the imposition of Post-Release Supervision ("PRS") after they completed
the terms of their incarceration and were released from prison.2 Each
defendant claimed that this PRS procedure was tantamount to imposing a second punishment for the same crime, prohibited by the
Double Jeopardy Clause of both the United States and New York
State Constitutions.3 The defendants argued that once they had been
released from confinement, they had established a "legitimate expectation of finality" in the original prison term.4 The New York Court
of Appeals agreed, holding that each defendant had indeed developed
a legitimate expectation of finality in the originally imposed sentences upon their release, and that the imposition of PRS, although
statutorily required, violated the defendants' right to be free from
multiple punishments.'
In 2004, one of the five defendants, Darrell Williams, was
sentenced to three years imprisonment for assault in the second degree.6 As part of the plea deal, his term of imprisonment was to be
followed by three years of PRS.7 Although the court accepted the
plea, the judge "did not formally pronounce the term of PRS during
the sentencing proceeding."' When Williams was released from
' 925 N.E.2d 878 (N.Y. 2010).
Id at 887.

2

3 Id. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in part: "No person
shall be . . . subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." Article
I, section 6 of the New York State Constitution states, in part: "No person shall be subject to
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense."
4 Williams, 925 N.E.2d at 887.
' Id. at 891.
6 Id. at 884.
Id.
8

Id.
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prison in 2006, the Department of Correction Services ("DOCS")
administratively imposed, as a condition of his release, a three-year
term of PRS, and in May 2007, Williams was reincarcerated for violating his PRS. 9 Subsequently, DOCS notified the sentencing court
of its failure to properly impose the PRS component and Williams
was resentenced to the three-year term of PRS.'o
Another defendant, Efrain Hernandez, was sentenced to seven
years imprisonment after pleading guilty to burglary in the second
degree." The requisite component of PRS following imprisonment
was not discussed at either the plea proceeding or the sentencing. 12
Upon release from prison in December 2005, DOCS administratively
imposed PRS for a term of five years.' 3 When Hernandez was found
to have violated the conditions of his PRS and was sent back to prison, he was resentenced to a five-year period of PRS pursuant to section 601-d of the New York Correction Law.14
A third defendant, Craig Lewis, was convicted of burglary
and two counts of criminal contempt, and sentenced to confinement
for five years.' 5 Although it was required by law, the sentencing
court did not impose a period of PRS.16 Instead, DOCS administra-

9 Williams, 925 N.E.2d at 884.
1o Id

[The] [s]upreme [c]ourt concluded that it had the inherent authority to
correct the original sentence because it was illegal in the absence of a period of PRS. The court did, however, order that Williams be immediately released from custody on the rationale that he could not have violated
PRS before it was a proper component of his sentence.
Id. (alteration to the original). Upon appeal, the sentence was affirmed by the appellate division. Id. (citing People v. Williams, 871 N.Y.S.2d 908 (App. Div. 1st Dep't 2009)).
"Id.
12

Williams, 925 N.E.2d at 884.

3 Id.
14 jd

[The] [slupreme [clourt determined that there were no legal impediments
to the resentencing procedure under CorrectionLaw § 601-d because the
original sentence was illegal without a term of PRS and Hernandez could
not have had a reasonable expectation of finality in that sentence once
DOCS informed him that PRS was required.
Id. (alteration to the original). "The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that a sentencing
court has the inherent power to correct an illegal sentence even if the correction occurs more
than one year after conviction." Id. (citation omitted).
's Williams, 925 N.E.2d at 885.
16 Id.
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tively imposed the requisite period of PRS.17 When Lewis was released from confinement, DOCS initiated resentencing proceedings
pursuant to section 601-d of the Correction Law, and he was resentenced to a five-year period of PRS.s
A fourth defendant, Danny Echevarria, received an aggregate
prison sentence of five years in return for pleading guilty to first degree rape.' 9 Like the other defendants, the requisite period of PRS
was not discussed during his plea proceeding and it was not formally
imposed at sentencing as part of the original sentence. 2 0 However,
his attorney did reference PRS during his sentencing proceeding. 2'
In addition, prior to Echevarria's release from prison, "he signed a
DOCS certificate acknowledging a term of PRS."2 2 After violating
his PRS on several occasions, Echevarria was reincarcerated and
DOCS initiated resentencing proceedings so that Echevarria would be
formally sentenced to PRS.2 3
The fifth defendant, Edwin Rodriguez, received seven years
imprisonment for pleading guilty to second degree burglary. 24 Although a mandatory term of PRS was never formally imposed,
"DOCS later informed Rodriguez that he was required to serve five
years of PRS" subsequent to his release from prison.2 5 Rodriguez
was conditionally released from prison in 2007, and was arrested for
violating the conditions of his PRS later that same year.2 6 Thereafter,
DOCS initiated resentencing proceedings and Rodriguez was resentenced to cure the defect in the original sentence.2 7
17 id.
18 Id.
19 Id
20
21
22
23

Williams, 925 N.E.2d at 885.
id.
id
id

Petitioner commenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding . .. seeking relief in
the nature of prohibition to preclude resentencing on jurisdictional and
constitutional grounds. In dismissing the petition, the Appellate Division reasoned that ... Echevarria could not pursue discretionary prohibition relief because he had an adequate remedy at law-a direct appeal
from his resentencing.
Id. (citing People v. Echevarria, 869 N.Y.S.2d 837 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 2008))
24 Williams, 925 N.E.2d at 885.
25 id
26

id

27

Id. The appellate division affirmed. Id. (citing People v. Rodriguez, 874 N.Y.S.2d 117
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Under New York law, the inclusion of a period of PRS to follow a determinate prison sentence is required by section 70.45 of the
New York Penal Law, or Jenna's Law, which was adopted by the
New York Legislature in 1998.28 The statute mandates "that postrelease supervision is a mandatory component of all determinate prison
sentences." 29 The legislative intent behind its adoption "was to abolish parole and institute determinate terms of imprisonment for certain felony offenses."3
In addition, this PRS is designed to help
newly released individuals assimilate back into society.3 1 Under the
statute, the Board of Parole is responsible for the establishment and
imposition of conditions of an individual's PRS. 32 Some of the general conditions may include: regular visits and reports to the assigned
parole officer, the inability to travel outside the state, and a general
compliance with federal and state laws.33 The released defendants
are potentially subject to unannounced visits by the assigned parole
officer, which may result in searches of the person, residence, or
property.34 A violation of any condition of PRS during the imposed
period may subject a defendant to a period of further imprisonment.3 5
The newly enacted statute requires that the period of PRS be
formally pronounced during the sentencing proceeding and a failure
of the sentencing court to properly pronounce PRS renders the sentence illegal.36 According to the New York Court of Appeals, such
illegal sentences may not be corrected by DOCS because the department did not have the authority to perform the inherently judicial

(App. Div. 1st Dep't 2009)).
28 Williams, 925 N.E.2d at 881; N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.45 (McKinney
2010) ("When a
court imposes a determinate sentence it shall in each case state not only the term of imprisonment, but also an additional period of post-release supervision . . .
29 Williams, 925 N.E.2d at 881.
30 id.
31 New York State ParoleHandbook Questions and Answers ConcerningParoleRelease
and Supervision, N.Y. Div. OF PAROLE, at 3 (Nov. 2010), https://www.parole.state.ny.us/pdf/
handbook-nov2010.pdf.
32 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.45(3) (McKinney 2010) ("The board of parole shall establish
and impose conditions of post-release supervision in the same manner and to the same extent
as it may establish and impose conditions in accordance with the executive law upon persons
who are granted parole or conditional release.").
33 New York State Parole Handbook, supranote 31, at 21.
34Id.
3s N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.45(1) (McKinney 2010).
36 Williams, 925 N.E.2d at 881.
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Because the failure to formally pronounce
function of sentencing.
the period of PRS was becoming commonplace, in 2008, the New
York State Legislature "enact[ed] Correction Law [section] 601-d to
provide a mechanism for courts to consider resentencing defendants
serving determinate sentences" in cases where the courts failed to
properly pronounce the PRS during the original sentencing proceed38
ing.
The appellants in People v. WilliamS39 challenged the constitutionality of the new resentencing procedure as a violation of the
Double Jeopardy Clause of both the United States Constitution and
the New York Constitution. 4 0 Upon appeal, each claimed that because they had completed their terms of imprisonment, they all acquired a " 'legitimate expectation of finality' in the[ir] sentences." 4 '
Therefore, the appellants maintained that imposing the requisite PRS
after their release from prison was a multiple punishment prohibited
by the Double Jeopardy Clause.42
New York's highest court recognized the illegality of each of
the defendant's original sentences and noted the inherent ability of
sentencing courts to correct the illegal sentences beyond the one-year
term for appeal set forth in section 440.40 of the New York Criminal
Procedure Law. 43 As the majority stated in its decision, "criminal defendants . . . are presumed to be aware that [under New York Law] a

determinate prison sentence without a term of PRS is illegal and,
thus, may be corrected by the sentencing court at some point in the
future."" Because the sentence is illegal and subject to correction, "a
defendant cannot claim a legitimate expectation that the originally-

37 Id. (citing Garner v. N.Y. Dep't of Corr. Servs., 889 N.E.2d 467,468 (N.Y. 2008)).
38 Id. (alteration to the original). See N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 601-d (Consol. 2010).

3 925 N.E.2d 878.
4 Id. at 887. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in part: "No
person shall be . . . subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."
Article 1, section 6 of the New York Constitution states, in part: "No person shall be subject
to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." In addition to the double jeopardy challenges, the defendants also raised statutory challenges to their resentencing proceedings.
Williams, 925 N.E.2d at 886.
" Williams, 925 N.E.2d.at 887 (alteration to the original).
42

id

43 Id. at 889.

4 Id. (citing People v. Sparber, 889 N.E.2d 459, 466 (N.Y. 2008)) (alteration to the original).
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imposed, improper sentence is final for all purposes." 45 However, it
was the majority's opinion that "there must be a temporal limitation
on . .. [the criminal court's] jurisdiction over all persons who were
once sentenced for criminal acts."46 Accordingly, the temporal limitation imposed on the court's power to increase sentences turns on
whether the defendants acquired a legitimate expectation of finality
in their sentences.4 7 The court went on to state that "once the initial
sentence has been served and the direct appeal has been completed
(or the time to appeal has expired)," even if the initial sentence was
illegal, the defendant had a legitimate expectation of finality in the
sentence.48
The majority in Williams rejected the People's argument that
no such expectation should have arisen "because [the] defendants
were released from custody . . . [prior to serving their entire] terms of

imprisonment," as provided by the statute, "which withholds credit
for the unserved portion of a prison term until PRS is successfully
completed." 4 9 Furthermore, the court rejected the People's second
argument, that "before defendants were released from prison, [they]
were aware that they had to serve PRS" because of certain writings
executed by the defendants regarding their respective PRS requirements and that "any expectations [the] defendants may have had regarding the finality of the originally-imposed illegal sentences were
neither legitimate nor reasonable."50 The Williams majority rejected
these arguments based in part on recent decisions which held that
" 'sentencing is a uniquely judicial responsibility' . . . [and] the administrative imposition by DOCS of [PRS] ... is a nullity and cannot

negate [the] defendant's reasonable expectation that, once completed,
the imposed sentence will not be increased." 5 Thus, the New York
Court of Appeals concluded that the defendants had indeed acquired
a legitimate expectation of finality in their originally imposed sen-

46

Id. at 889-90 (citing United States v. Fogel, 829 F.2d 77 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
Williams, 925 N.E.2d at 890 (alteration to the original).

47

id

48

id

4

Id. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.45(5)(a) (McKinney 2010).
so Williams, 925 N.E.2d at 890. The People further asserted that defendant Williams' legitimate expectations were undermined based upon the fact that he had agreed to post release
supervision as part of his plea agreement. Id.
51 Id. (quoting Sparber, 889 N.E.2d at 464) (alteration to the original) (internal citations
omitted).
49
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tences upon their release from imprisonment, and that resentencing
them to a formally-imposed term of PRS ran afoul of the Fifth
Amendment's double jeopardy protections against multiple punishments.5 2
However, two dissenting justices53 had difficulty with the majority's reasoning, arguing that the majority had misapplied the principle of a "legitimate expectation of finality." 5 4 Justice Pigott urged
that "[a] defendant cannot acquire a legitimate expectation of finality
from the mere fact that he has been released from prison."" He argued that it defied logic for a defendant, who was presumed to be
aware that the originally-imposed sentence was illegal and thus subject to correction, to acquire a legitimate expectation that the original
illegal sentence was final. 56 Justice Pigott's dissent stood for the position that, upon correction of the sentence in a resentencing proceeding, "a court does not violate a defendant's double jeopardy protections when it merely 'set[s] aside what it had no authority to do and
substitutes directions required by law.' "s7 In a separate dissenting
opinion, Justice Smith maintained that the majority had falsely
"creat[ed] a 'legitimate expectation of finality' test for double jeopardy upon resentencing," and that double jeopardy issues surrounding
the resentencing of defendants had been mostly eliminated by the Supreme Court. Accordingly, both dissenters would have found that
the correction of the defendants' imprisonment sentences to impose
mandatory PRS was in compliance with the defendants' double jeopardy protections.59
The majority in Williams was not persuaded by the reasoning
52Id.
5

at 891.

Id. at 893-95 (Smith, J., dissenting); Williams, 925 N.E.2d at 895-99 (Pigott, J., dissent-

ing).
54 Id. at 893-94 (Smith, J., dissenting). "The majority's holding that 'there is a legitimate
expectation of finality once the sentence has been served and the direct appeal has been
completed . . . ' fundamentally misunderstands the concept of an expectation of finality in
double jeopardy jurisprudence." Id. at 897-98 (Pigott, J., dissenting).
* Id. at 897.
6

Id. at 896.

* Williams, 925 N.E.2d at 896 (quoting Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 167
(1947)) (alteration in the original).
5 Id. at 893-95 (Smith, J., dissenting) (alteration to the original). Justice Smith interpreted the Supreme Court's ruling in DiFrancescoas "largely eliminating double jeopardy
issues in resentencing cases." Id. at 894 (citing Dewitt v. Ventetoulo, 6 F.3d 32, 34 (1st Cir.
1993); United States v. Lundien, 769 F.2d 981, 986 (4th Cir. 1985)).
5 See id. at 895; see also id. at 898 (Pigott, J., dissenting).
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of the dissenting justices and, ruling as a matter of federal law, the
New York Court of Appeals sustained the defendants' double jeopardy challenges to their resentencing procedures, holding as follows:
[O]nce a defendant is released from custody and returns to the community after serving the period of incarceration that was ordered by the sentencing court,
and the time to appeal the sentence has expired or the
appeal has been finally determined, there is a legitimate expectation that the sentence, although illegal
under the Penal Law, is final and the Double Jeopardy
Clause prevents a court from modifying the sentence
to include a period of postrelease supervision.6 0
The intent behind the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment was to "protect an individual from being subjected to the
hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once for an alleged
offense." 6 1 Throughout the history of double jeopardy jurisprudence,
the United States Supreme Court has interpreted the clause to encompass three distinct protections. 62 However, the double jeopardy challenges presented in Williams are relevant only to the third category of
protection: the multiple punishments doctrine, or "the right not to be
punished more than once for the same crime." 63 A seminal case
where the Supreme Court dealt with the multiple punishment protec60 Williams, 925 N.E.2d at 891 (majority opinion).
61 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957).

The underlying idea . . . is that the State with all its resources and power
should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual
for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even
though innocent he may be found guilty.
Id. at 187-88.
62 Williams, 925 N.E.2d at 887. As the majority in Williams noted:
The United States Supreme Court has construed this language to cover
three distinct protections: (1) the right to be free from a second trial following an acquittal for the same crime; (2) the right to be free from a
second trial following a conviction for the same offense; and (3) the right
not to be punished more than once for the same crime.
Id.
63 Id. "[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment has application to the
States through the Fourteenth Amendment." United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117,
131 n.12 (1980) (citing Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)).
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tion was Ex parte Lang.' In that case, which was decided in 1874,
the defendant was sentenced to a year in jail and a two-hundred dollar
fine for the crimes he committed. 65 The punishment for his offense,
however, authorized imprisonment or a fine, but not both. 66 The Supreme Court found that "the imposition of the second sentence violated the Double Jeopardy Clause because, after paying the fine specified in the original sentence, no other penalty could be legally
imposed upon the defendant." 67 The Court reasoned that once a defendant has completed a legal punishment for a crime, the Double
Jeopardy Clause prevented the Court from imposing additional puHowever, following Ex parte Lang, the issue remained
nishment.
unsettled whether a defendant may, after the commencement of a
sentence, be subject to further resentencing.6 9
In 1947, the Supreme Court addressed whether the Double
Jeopardy Clause prohibited resentencing a defendant once he began
serving the sentence in Bozza v. United States.70 In Bozza, the defendant's offense carried a minimum mandatory sentence of a one hundred dollar fine and a term of imprisonment. 7 ' However, at his sentencing proceeding, the judge only mentioned imprisonment.72 Later
that same day, he was brought back before the judge, informed of the
error, and his sentence was amended to include the mandatory fine.73
On appeal, the defendant argued that adding a fine to his prison sentence after he began to serve the sentence constituted a violation of
the Double Jeopardy Clause. 7 4 The Supreme Court, finding no constitutional violation, held that "[t]he sentence, as corrected, imposes a
valid punishment for [his] offense instead of an invalid punishment"
and the Double Jeopardy clause "does not require that sentencing
should be a game in which a wrong move by the judge means im85 U.S. 163 (1874).
Id. at 175.

6

66 Id.

67 Williams, 925 N.E.2d at 887 (citing Ex Parte Lang, 85 U.S. at 176).
68 Ex parteLang, 85 U.S. at 176 ("[W]hen the [defendant] . .. , by reason of a valid judg-

ment, had fully suffered one of the alternative punishments to which alone the law subjected
him, the power of the court to punish further was gone.") (alteration to the original).
69 Williams, 925 N.E.2d at 888.
70 330 U.S. 160.
' Id. at 165.
72

id.

7 Id. at 165-66.
74 Id. at 166.
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munity for the prisoner."7 5
Thus, the Court in Bozza determined that resentencing a defendant to correct an illegal sentence, once the sentence had begun,
did not trigger a double jeopardy violation. However, if strictly construed by its facts, the holding in Bozza does not give adequate guidance to resentencing proceedings that take place more than one day
after the original sentence is commenced.
76 decided in 1980, the SuIn United States v. DiFrancesco,
preme Court expanded its holding in Bozza beyond same-day sentencing corrections." While reviewing whether a federal statute violated the Fifth Amendment, the Court determined "[t]he Double
Jeopardy Clause does not provide the defendant with the right to
know at any specific moment in time what the exact limit of his punishment will turn out to be."7 8 Citing Bozza, the Court maintained
that the jurisprudence surrounding sentencing suggested "that a sentence does not have the qualities of constitutional finality that attend
an acquittal," and therefore, were not subject to the more rigid protections afforded to the prohibition against multiple trials.79 Instead, the
Court reasoned that the Double Jeopardy Clause will limit the courts'
ability to increase a sentence when the defendant has an expectation
of finality in the original sentence.o Ultimately, the Supreme Court
in DiFrancescofound that the defendant had not acquired the requisite expectation of finality that would protect him from being subjected to further resentencing. 8 ' Although it was never succinctly
stated by the Court in its opinion, the decision in DiFrancesco has
been interpreted by the courts as setting forth the "legitimate expectation of finality" principle applicable to double jeopardy challenges to
resentencing procedures. 82
7 Bozza, 330 U.S. at 166-67.
6

449 U.S. 117.

n Id. at 137.
78 Id. "The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 ... authorizes the imposition of an
in-

creased sentence upon a convicted dangerous special offender . . . and grants the United
States the right, under specified conditions, to take that sentence to the Court of Appeals for
review. .. ." Id. at 118-20 (internal citations omitted).
7 Id. at 137-38.
8o

Id. at 136.

81 DiFrancesco,449 U.S. at 139. The defendant was "aware that a dangerous special
offender sentence is subject to increase on appeal. His legitimate expectations are not defeated
if his sentence is increased on appeal ..... Id. at 137.
82 See infra notes 86-91, 102-104, and accompanying text.
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As the majority in Williams noted in its decision, the Supreme
Court has not evaluated the legitimate expectation of finality principle in cases where a defendant completed an originally illegal sentence and was subsequently resentenced to the proper punishment.83
However, although not binding precedent, the federal courts have decided similar issues surrounding resentencing proceedings that may
be applied to the issue presented in Williams.8 4
For example, in United States v. Rourke," the defendant's
sentence was corrected by adding the requisite parole term that was
discussed during the plea agreement, but was not formally announced
at sentencing. 86 On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the defendant argued
that the resentencing that imposed the mandatory parole term constituted a double jeopardy violation.8 ' The Tenth Circuit, however,
emphasized that the omission of the mandatory parole term from the
original sentence rendered it illegal.88 As a result, the court found
that "[a] defendant cannot acquire a legitimate expectation of finality
in a sentence which is illegal, because such a sentence remains subject to modification." 89 Accordingly, "[b]ecause [the defendant]
lacked a reasonable expectation of finality in his original sentencing,"
resentencing the defendant to cure the illegal sentence did not violate
the prohibition of double jeopardy, "even though [the defendant's]
sentence was increased." 90
A similar challenge was presented in United States v. Warner,91 another case in which a sentencing court failed to impose a
mandatory parole term at the sentencing proceeding. 92 The district
" Williams, 925 N.E.2d at 888.
8 See infra notes 86-104 and accompanying text.
8 984 F.2d 1063 (10th Cir. 1992).
86

Id. at 1065.

87 Id.

8 Id. at 1066 (emphasis added).
89 Id. (citing Bozza, 330 U.S. at 166-67) (emphasis added).
90 Rourke, 984 F.2d at 1066 (alteration to the original).
9' 690 F.2d 545 (6th Cir. 1982).
9' Id. at 555.

21 US.C. § 841(b) (1) (A) requires the imposition of a special parole
term of at least six years whenever a defendant with a prior conviction is
sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Since [the defendant] had a prior
conviction under 21 US.C. § 841, the district court was required to sentence [the defendant] to a six year special parole term.
Id. (alteration to the original).
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court later included the mandatory special parole term in its judgment
and commitment order.93 Rejecting Warner's challenge that the imposition of the special parole term violated his protection against
multiple punishments, the Sixth Circuit cited a history of federal jurisprudence that "has held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not
prohibit amending a sentence to add a mandatory special parole
term." 94
While these decisions further support the rule that a defendant
cannot claim a legitimate expectation of finality in a illegal sentence,
it must be noted, however, that in both Rourke and Warner, the imposition of the mandatory parole terms had been added prior to the defendants' completion of their respective sentences. 95 On the other
hand, in Williams, the period of PRS to cure the illegal sentence was
not formally imposed on all five defendants until after they were released from prison. 96
In light of this distinction, it is important to revisit the federal
cases that involve double jeopardy challenges to resentencing proceedings commenced after the initial sentences were completed to determine whether this factor will disrupt the rule pertaining to illegal
sentences. For example, in United States v. Arrellano-Rios,97 the
Ninth Circuit rejected the government's request for a remand to reevaluate sentences that were already affirmed upon appeal and had
been completed by the defendant. 98 The Ninth Circuit held that "increasing a legal sentence that already has been fully served would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause."99 Although the federal court declined to decide at "what [precise] point, in the service of a
defendant's legal sentence, a reasonable expectation of finality arises," the court found "that the expectation has arisen, and jeopardy has
attached, upon its completion," and "reaffirm[ed] the rule that init has been fully served violates the
creasing a legal sentence after
00
Clause."'
Jeopardy
Double

94 id
95 See Rourke, 984 F.2d at 1065; Warner, 690 F.2d at 555.
96 Williams, 925 N.E.2d at 883-84.

9 799 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1986).
98 Id. at 523.
9 Id. at 524-25 (emphasis added).
1" Id. at 524-25 (emphasis added).
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Similarly, in United States v. Daddino,'0' the Seventh Circuit
also found that once "[the defendant] had completed service of his
incarceration and paid all fines and restitution, . . . [he had] acquired

a legitimate expectation of finality in both the length of his incarceration and the amount of his fines and restitution." 02 Thus, the resentencing of the defendant to impose an increased imprisonment term,
or increasing the amount of fines or restitution after he completed an
otherwise legal sentence, constituted a multiple punishment prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause.103
While the holdings in Arrellano-Rios and Daddino may suggest that the completion of a term of imprisonment may give rise to
an expectation of finality, it must not be overlooked that both defendants were handed sentences that on the outset were each legally valid punishments.1 04 As such, the circuit courts were not required to
incorporate the implications of an illegal sentence on each defendant's respective expectation of finality.
Although there is no mention by the majority of the New
York Court of Appeals in the Williams decision, the New York State
Constitution also provides double jeopardy protection: article I, section 6 provides that "no person shall be subject to be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." 05 However, when confronted with
double jeopardy challenges, the New York courts regularly apply
federal precedent to resolve the issue.106 In so doing, New York
courts purport to provide the same protections as set forth by the Fifth
Amendment."10

Prior to Williams, when presented with double jeopardy challenges by defendants who were subjected to resentencing proceedings, New York courts have typically applied DiFrancescoand ana'o' 5 F.3d 262 (7th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 265 (alteration to the original).

102

103 id
104 See supra notes 100-104
105 N.Y. CONsT. art. I, 6.

and accompanying text.

§

106 See generally People ex rel. Pamblanco v. Rikers Island Corr. Facility, 868 N.Y.S.2d
505, 510 (Sup. Ct. 2008); People v. Minaya, 429 N.E.2d 1161, 1163 (N.Y. 1981).
107For example, in De Canzio v. Kennedy, the court found "the jeopardy clauses of the
Federal and [New York] State Constitutions are 'to protect the defendant's basic human
right not to be harassed, or perhaps even impoverished, by successive prosecutions for the
same offense' by means of multiple trials [nor] multiple punishments." 415 N.Y.S.2d 513,
516 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1979) (quoting Matter of Cardin v. Sedita, 53 A.D.2d 253, 256
(App. Div. 4th Dep't 1976)) (emphasis added).
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lyzed their challenges "on the basis of the defendants' legitimate expectations." 0 8 Utilizing the same test used by the federal courts, the
New York courts have reached varying results.
For example, in People v. Minaya,10 9 which was decided
shortly after DiFrancesco,the New York Court of Appeals reviewed
a defendant's challenge to his resentencing proceedings where the defendant "plead guilty to attempted robbery in the first degree in exchange for an eight-year" prison term and the sentencing court mistakenly pronounced the maximum sentence to be three years." 0 After
the prosecution recognized the error and filed an application with the
sentencing court to review the plea agreement and correct the sentence accordingly, the sentencing court found the three-year pronouncement to be erroneous and resentenced the defendant to a term
of eight years imprisonment."' In finding that there was no double
jeopardy violation, the New York Court of Appeals recognized the
inherent ability of the sentencing courts to correct clerical errors in
sentencing "where it is made . . . to conform the record to the

truth."ll 2 The court held that "a defendant who is mistakenly sentenced to a lesser term than he agreed to, should [not] immediately
upon commencing of the sentence acquire a vested interest in the error so that it would be unfair, under the [D]ouble [J]eopardy [C]lause,
to correct the error."ll 3 However, although the resentencing proceeding took place several months after the original sentencing, the defendant had not completed his original sentence. 114
Leading up to the decision in Williams, the New York Court
of Appeals had not addressed a defendant's double jeopardy challenge to a resentencing proceeding that sought to correct an illegal
sentence after the sentence was already completed. However, the
lower state courts have faced the precise issue presented in Williams.
For example, in People ex rel. Pamblanco v. Rikers Island Correc'os Pamblanco, 868 N.Y.S.2d at 510. "There is no bright-line period set by statute or case
law that indicates when double jeopardy is violated upon resentencing. Instead, the Supreme
Court introduced the more amorphous concept of 'expectation of finality.' " Id. at 509
(quoting DiFrancesco,449 U.S. at 139).
1
429 N.E.2d 1161 (N.Y. 1981).
110

Id at 1162.

"'Id
112

Idat 1162-63.

113 Id. at 1164 (alteration to the original).
"4 Minaya, 429 N.E.2d at 1162.
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tional Facility,"' a lower court decision from 2008, a defendant
pleaded guilty to robbery in the first degree and was sentenced to six
years imprisonment. 116 The sentencing court did not impose PRS at
the sentencing proceeding, but DOCS administratively imposed a
five-year period of PRS." 7 After the defendant was freed from confinement, the defendant was subsequently reincarcerated for violating
the conditions of his PRS." 8 The defendant argued that, although a
period of PRS should have been imposed at the original sentencing
proceeding, "since it was not imposed at sentenc[ing], the sentence
cannot, over a full year after the completion of the imposed sentence,
be modified" without violating his double jeopardy rights."' 9 The
court agreed, finding that the "petitioner had every expectation of finality that his sentence was completed," and that a resentencing proceeding to impose PRS was barred by the Fifth Amendment.120
Therefore, the court found the completion of the sentence to be controlling on the defendant's expectation of finality and that the illegality of the original sentence did not upset this expectation.
However, the following year, in People v. Thompson,121 the
same lower court facing a similar challenge reached the opposite outcome. In Thompson, the defendant was sentenced to a prison term of
seven years upon being convicted of assault in the second degree. 122
Under Jenna's Law, section 70.45 of the New York Penal Law, the
defendant's determinate prison sentence was required to include a period of PRS following the term of imprisonment.123 However, the period of PRS was not formally pronounced at his sentencing, which
rendered the defendant's sentence illegal.124 The New York State
Department of Corrections recognized the error and, upon the defendant's release from prison, released him to the Division of Parole and
initiated resentencing proceedings so that the PRS component of his

"' 868 N.Y.S.2d 505 (Sup. Ct. 2008).
116 Id. at 506.
"
8

Id. at 507.
Id. at 506.

Id. at 509.
120Pamblanco,868 N.Y.S.2d at 509.
121 No. 4609/99, 2009 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 265, at *1 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 11, 2009).
122 id.
123 Id. at *3.
124 Id. at *4.
1l9
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sentence could be formally pronounced.125 On appeal, the defendant
argued that because he had completed his sentence of imprisonment,
imposing PRS after his release violated his constitutional protection
against multiple punishments.1 26 Denying his motion to preclude resentencing, the court reasoned that "[t]he Double Jeopardy Clause
does not provide a blanket prohibition against the imposition of additional punishment in a resentencing proceeding when such additional
punishment could lawfully have been imposed as part of the original
sentence." 27 The lower court recognized that a defendant's double
jeopardy protection in relation to his resentencing proceeding turns
on whether "a defendant ha[d acquired] a legitimate expectation of
finality [in his sentence, and if so,] then an increase in that sentence is
prohibited." 28 The court found, however, that the defendant could
not have had a legitimate expectation of finality in his sentence because it was illegal from the outset and even his completion of the
sentence would not create this expectation.129 Thus, the court in
Thompson found the illegality of the sentence to be controlling, and
even though the sentence was complete, the defendant could not have
acquired the requisite expectation of finality in the sentence that
would prevent further resentencing to cure the defect.130
After evaluating the federal and New York State judicial history surrounding double jeopardy challenges to resentencing proceedings, it is reasonable to conclude that the majority in Williams was
prudent in applying the "legitimate expectation of finality" criteria set
forth in DiFrancescowhen evaluating the defendants' challenges to
their respective resentencing to include PRS. However, the double
jeopardy challenge in Williams actually involved two distinct issues
which have only been evaluated by the federal courts and the United
States Supreme Court separately.13' There was no binding legal
125 Id *1-2.
126

Thompson, 2009 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 265, at *6.

127 Id. at *6-7.

Id. at *8 ("[T]he legitimacy of a defendant's expectation of finality in the severity of a
sentence is dependent upon objective circumstances or the absence thereof of a factual or
legal nature which raise the possibility that the original sentence may be modified at a later
time.").
129 Id at *10 ("Regardless of a defendant's personal hope or subjective belief, such illegal
lenience is an objective legal circumstance which undermines the constitutionally recognizable legitimacy of his expectation of finality.").
128

130 See id
131 See supra notes 85-103 and accompanying text.
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precedent involving post release sentencing where both the initial
sentence was illegal and the defendant had been released from imprisonment.13 2 The majority in Williams focused heavily on the defendants' completion of their terms of imprisonment and found this factor to be dispositive, rather than the illegality of the sentence, when
evaluating the expectations of the defendants.' 3 3
In its majority opinion, the New York Court of Appeals set
forth in great detail the legislative and legal history upon which it
based its decision, including the newly enacted statute, Jenna's Law,
and recent cases decided by the federal courts.134 However, the focus
by the majority in Williams on the defendants' release from imprisonment failed to give proper weight to the crucial fact that they all
were originally handed sentences which were illegal at their onset.
Although the court did concede the existence of this fact," it ultimately erred by not adequately recognizing the impact the illegal sentence made on a double jeopardy challenge to resentencing. Inasmuch as a double jeopardy challenge to resentencing turns on a
defendant's legitimate expectation of finality in his sentence, the defendant's legitimate expectation turns on the legality of the original
sentence itself. The precedents surrounding multiple punishment
protection in resentencing cases have consistently distinguished between whether the original sentence imposed was legal or illegal,
with the latter illegal sentences crucial to shaping the defendant's ex-

pectations.136
It is presumed that all defendants are aware of the laws relevant to their case; thus they are presumed to be aware of an illegal
sentence.1 37 This presumption has repeatedly led the courts to determine that a defendant who has been given an illegal sentence is unable to acquire a legitimate expectation of finality that would prohibit
resentencing to correct it, regardless of how long after the original
sentencing the resentencing took place.' 38 The majority in Williams,
while recognizing this, nonetheless felt that the ability of the courts to
132See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
13 See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
1'
Williams, 925 N.E.2d at 881-93.
1 See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
136 See supra notes 70-75, 85-94 and accompanying text.
137See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
138 See supra notes 70-75, 85-94 and accompanying text.
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correct an illegal sentence must be limited.139 The majority concluded that this limitation would manifest at the completion of the
sentence, illegality notwithstanding.1 40 It is this line of reasoning by
the court that departs from the federal precedent surrounding double
jeopardy challenges to resentencing.
The Supreme Court has already imposed a temporal limitation
in this area by establishing the criteria for "a legitimate expectation of
finality."l41 With it, the Supreme Court has provided for some flexibility in evaluating such circumstances. If the Supreme Court felt
that the expectation automatically arises after expiration of the right
to appeal and completion of a prison sentence, regardless of the sentence's legality, then it is reasonable to assume it would have succinctly stated so as to prevent its misapplication. However, presumably the Supreme Court felt such rigidity was not suitable for such
determinations. Couldn't circumstances exist for a defendant to acquire the requisite expectation before such events? And in similar fashion, couldn't a scenario exist where such events would come to
pass and the defendant had yet to acquire expectations of finality?
The issue presented to the New York Court of Appeals in Williams was distinctly different than those which preceded the holdings
in Arrellano-Rios and Daddino, which presumably persuaded the
court.142 The sentences in those cases were legally sufficient, while
the original sentences in Williams, which omitted the mandatory
PRS, were illegal.143 It was because the defendants in Arrellano-Rios
and Daddino had completed otherwise legal sentences that they were
able to establish legitimate expectations of finality in their respective
sentences.'a As a result, it would seem logical that the opinions in
Rourke and Warner would be more applicable in Williams and suggest a holding that the defendants could not have acquired a legitimate expectation of finality in an illegal sentence.
Considering, however, that Rourke and Warner are both also
distinguishable because the defendants had yet to complete their origSee supra
'4 See supra
141See supra
142 See supra

notes 45-46 and accompanying text
notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
notes 28, 36, 43-48 and accompanying text. Cf supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
143 See supra notes 28, 36, 43-48 and accompanying text. Cf supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
14 See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
139
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inal sentence, 14 it may be wise to assess other factors to evaluate the
defendants' expectations and find neither the completed sentence nor
its illegality as the sole controlling factor. In Williams, the record
suggested that all the defendants were aware of the requisite PRS in
addition to their term of imprisonment.146 If none of the defendants
ever claimed to be unaware of the PRS component of their sentences
upon imprisonment, or denied being informed of the PRS before being conditionally released, then how could any of the defendants have
reasonably acquired a legitimate expectation of finality in their sentences and expected that they would not be required to serve the
mandatory PRS term? Again, the court disregards these facts and instead holds that a "temporal limitation" in a court's ability to correct
mistakes prevents them from becoming consequential. 147
Indeed, the double jeopardy challenges before the New York
Court of Appeals were complex in that the five defendants' completed illegal sentences required the application of two established
principles that, when handled separately, may direct the court to
reach different outcomes. However, the New York lower courts provided an intuitive analysis of the precise issue prior to its culmination
before New York's highest court.148 Specifically, the court in
Thompson seemed to rule in a manner consistent with the binding
double jeopardy jurisprudence. Albeit in no way binding, the
Thompson decision should have induced a hard look by New York's
highest court, considering the issue decided there was nearly identical
to the one before it.' 49 The decision in Thompson becomes even
more compelling considering that just prior to it, the same court
found for the opposite result while faced with similar facts in Pamblanco.s 0
Moreover, the New York legislature has taken several measures to ensure that a period of PRS follows certain sentences of imprisonment.'"' In fact, had the majority not found a constitutional violation, New York law authorized the resentencing of the defendants
145See supra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
146See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
147 See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
148See supra text accompanying notes 115-129.
149See supra notes 121-29 and accompanying text.
Iso See supra notes 121-29 and accompanying text. Cf supra text accompanying notes
115-120.
151 See supra notes 28-29, 38 and accompanying text.
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to achieve harmony with the legislature's intent.' 52 The case law
emerging around New York's requirement of mandatory PRS was
relatively new when the defendants in Williams were sentenced, and
practices which were common in the past have subsequently been
prohibited by the courts.' 5 3 In light of this, the New York Court of
Appeals erred in holding that the resentencing for imposition of PRS
was unconstitutional. The courts in all five of these matters were
simply trying to correct a mistake caused by continually evolving
case law surrounding the PRS requirement. Allowing the defendants
to be resentenced to the mandatory PRS did nothing more than place
these defendants on the same level with any other defendants who
were convicted of the same criminal acts. Neither the United States
Constitution nor the New York State Constitution categorically prohibit this equality.
As noted earlier, the United States Supreme Court has failed
to rule on whether a defendant who has been released from imprisonment has acquired a legitimate expectation of finality in the sentence that would prevent any further resentencing if the initial sentence was illegal.15 4 It is also doubtful that the issue presented in
Williams will be addressed by the United States Supreme Court, since
it refused to grant certiorari in the matter. 55 Nonetheless, it would
have been appropriate for the Supreme Court to address this issue.
The absence of binding precedent surrounding the issue in Williams
left it susceptible to differing outcomes, as illustrated by the majority
and dissenting opinions in Williams.156 Ultimately, in reaching its
decision, the New York Court of Appeals in Williams has sharply departed from federal precedent surrounding double jeopardy challenges involving illegal sentences. Such departures are better suited
for the Supreme Court, which is charged with making the final

152See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
1 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
154 See supra text accompanying note 83.
15s New York v. Williams, No. 09-1425, 2010 WL 2070229, at *1 (U.S. Oct. 4, 2010)
cert. denied.
156 See supra notes 43-59 and accompanying text.
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determinations on federal constitutional issues.
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